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UAV Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks

UAV Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks

来源:Arxiv_logoArxiv
英文摘要

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) depend on untrusted software components to automate dangerous or critical missions, making them a desirable target for attacks. Some work has been done to prevent an attacker who has either compromised a ground control station or parts of a UAV's software from sabotaging the vehicle, but not both. We present an architecture running a UAV software stack with runtime monitoring and seL4-based software isolation that prevents attackers from both exploiting software bugs and stealthy attacks. Our architecture retrofits legacy UAVs and secures the popular MAVLink protocol, making wide adoption possible.

Arthur Amorim、Max Taylor、Trevor Kann、Gary T. Leavens、William L. Harrison、Lance Joneckis

航空航天技术自动化技术、自动化技术设备

Arthur Amorim,Max Taylor,Trevor Kann,Gary T. Leavens,William L. Harrison,Lance Joneckis.UAV Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks[EB/OL].(2025-03-21)[2025-07-09].https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.17298.点此复制

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