资金约束下基于买方融资的制造商融资策略研究

With the development of information technology, e-commerce platforms provide financing to small and micro enterprises with capital constraints through their own financial companies, which is a new idea to solve the capital problem. Based on the above background, this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model of a pull supply chain composed of upstream manufacturers and downstream self operated e-commerce platforms with capital constraints. As a leader, e-commerce platforms act as financiers and downstream retailers. Manufacturers finance through buyers\' credit and early payment provided by e-commerce platforms. Through solving, the following conclusions are obtained: the optimal production quantity and manufacturer\'s optimal profit increase monotonically with the wholesale price, the optimal profit of self operated platforms and supply chains is unimodal for the wholesale price, the optimal profit and production quantity of platforms decrease monotonically with the production cost, and the optimal wholesale price is the first-order condition for obtaining platform profit when the production cost is low, which is equal to the sum of the principal and interest of the production cost or cost when the production cost is high. Comparing the two financing strategies, it is found that the credit interest rate is positively correlated with the wholesale price and negatively correlated with the production quantity. The platform prefers early payment when the production cost is low. As the cost increases, the buyers\' credit becomes the first choice for financing, and the production cost is positively correlated with the optimal loan interest rate in the lower cost range and negatively correlated with the higher cost range