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Uncovering Reliable Indicators: Improving IoC Extraction from Threat Reports

Uncovering Reliable Indicators: Improving IoC Extraction from Threat Reports

来源:Arxiv_logoArxiv
英文摘要

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) are critical for threat detection and response, marking malicious activity across networks and systems. Yet, the effectiveness of automated IoC extraction systems is fundamentally limited by one key issue: the lack of high-quality ground truth. Current extraction tools rely either on manually extracted ground truth, which is labor-intensive and costly, or on automated ground truth creation methods that include non-malicious artifacts, leading to inflated false positive (FP) rates and unreliable threat intelligence. In this work, we analyze the shortcomings of existing ground truth creation strategies and address them by introducing the first hybrid human-in-the-loop pipeline for IoC extraction, which combines a large language model-based classifier (LANCE) with expert analyst validation. Our system improves precision through explainable, context-aware labeling and reduces analysts' work factor by 43% compared to manual annotation, as demonstrated in our evaluation with six analysts. Using this approach, we produce PRISM, a high-quality, publicly available benchmark of 1,791 labeled IoCs from 50 real-world threat reports. PRISM supports both fair evaluation and training of IoC extraction methods and enables reproducible research grounded in expert-validated indicators.

Evangelos Froudakis、Athanasios Avgetidis、Sean Tyler Frankum、Roberto Perdisci、Manos Antonakakis、Angelos Keromytis

计算技术、计算机技术自动化技术、自动化技术设备

Evangelos Froudakis,Athanasios Avgetidis,Sean Tyler Frankum,Roberto Perdisci,Manos Antonakakis,Angelos Keromytis.Uncovering Reliable Indicators: Improving IoC Extraction from Threat Reports[EB/OL].(2025-06-12)[2025-06-23].https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.11325.点此复制

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