Competition Erases Simplicity: Tight Regret Bounds for Uniform Pricing with Multiple Buyers

We study repeated \textsf{Uniform Pricing} mechanisms with multiple buyers. In each round, the platform sets a uniform price for all buyers; a transaction occurs if at least one buyer bids at or above this price. Prior work demonstrates that structural assumptions on bid distributions -- such as regularity or monotone hazard rate (MHR) property -- enable significant improvements in pricing query complexity (from $Θ\left(\varepsilon^{-3}\right)$ to $\widetildeΘ\left(\varepsilon^{-2}\right)$\footnote{The $\widetilde Θ$ notation omits polylogarithmic factors.}) and regret bounds (from $Θ\left(T^{2/3}\right)$ to $\widetildeΘ\left(T^{1/2}\right)$) for single-buyer settings. Strikingly, we demonstrate that these improvements vanish with multiple buyers: both general and structured distributions (including regular/MHR) share identical asymptotic performance, achieving pricing query complexity of $\widetildeΘ\left(\varepsilon^{-3}\right)$ and regret of $\widetildeΘ\left(T^{2/3}\right)$. This result reveals a dichotomy between single-agent and multi-agent environments. While the special structure of distributions simplifies learning for a single buyer, competition among multiple buyers erases these benefits, forcing platforms to adopt universally robust pricing strategies. Our findings challenge conventional wisdom from single-buyer theory and underscore the necessity of revisiting mechanism design principles in more competitive settings.