政府干预下高技术产业集群产学研协同创新行为适应性演化机制研究
Research on the Adaptive Evolution Mechanism of Industry-University-Research Collaborative Innovation Behavior in High-tech Industrial Clusters under Government Intervention
欧光军 1任慈航2
作者信息
- 1. 武汉科技大学管理学院，武汉 430065;湖北产业政策与管理研究中心，武汉 430000
- 2. 武汉科技大学管理学院，武汉 430065
- 折叠
摘要
高技术产业集群创新链产学研主体集聚与互动耦合是集群创新能力形成与演化的内在基础。文章从政府干预集群创新链产学研主体协同创新行为入手，构建高技术产业集群创新链多主体协同创新演化博弈模型，并进行仿真分析，探究多维协同创新机制对高技术产业集群创新链政产学研多主体协同创新行为演化的影响。研究发现，高技术产业集群创新链多主体协同创新过程受到"收益共享与成本分摊"机制、"背叛成本与投机收益"机制和"政府激励与惩罚"机制的共同影响，其中"收益共享与成本分摊"机制只是影响了博弈的演化速度，总收益和总成本才起到决定性作用；"背叛成本与投机收益"机制中，背叛成本与创新主体的协同创新意愿成同向关系，投机收益与协同创新意愿成反向关系；"政府激励与惩罚"机制中，较高的激励和惩罚额度能促进协同创新，但过高则会产生反作用。研究结论可以为高技术产业集群创新链产学研主体协同创新行为治理提供理论依据和实践启示。
Abstract
The aggregation and interactive coupling of industry, university, and research entities in the innovation chain of high-tech industry clusters are the intrinsic basis for the formation and evolution of cluster innovation capabilities. This article starts from government intervention in the collaborative innovation behavior of industry, university, and research entities within the cluster innovation chain, constructs a multi-agent collaborative innovation evolutionary game model for high-tech industry cluster innovation chains, and conducts simulation analysis to explore the impact of multi-dimensional collaborative innovation mechanisms on the evolution of government-industry-university-research multi-agent collaborative innovation behaviors in high-tech industry cluster innovation chains. The study finds that the multi-agent collaborative innovation process in high-tech industry cluster innovation chains is influenced jointly by the \'benefit-sharing and cost-sharing\' mechanism, the \'betrayal cost and speculative gain\' mechanism, and the \'government incentives and penalties\' mechanism. Among them, the \'benefit-sharing and cost-sharing\' mechanism only affects the evolutionary speed of the game, while the total benefits and total costs play the decisive role. In the \'betrayal cost and speculative gain\' mechanism, the betrayal cost is positively related to the collaborative innovation willingness of innovation entities, while speculative gain is negatively related to collaborative innovation willingness. In the \'government incentives and penalties\' mechanism, higher levels of incentives and penalties can promote collaborative innovation, but excessively high levels may have a counterproductive effect. The research conclusions can provide theoretical basis and practical insights for governing the collaborative innovation behavior of industry, university, and research entities in high-tech industry cluster innovation chains.关键词
技术经济及管理/高技术产业集群/多主体协同创新/演化博弈Key words
technology economy and management/high-tech industry clusters/multi-actor collaborative innovation/evolutionary game引用本文复制引用
欧光军,任慈航.政府干预下高技术产业集群产学研协同创新行为适应性演化机制研究[EB/OL].(2026-11-13)[2026-11-14].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/202611-10.学科分类
经济计划、经济管理
