银行、机构投资者与投资效率

If banks and institutional investors play the role of corporate governance is an important theoretical and practical problem, but extant literature hasn’t got a conclusion that is widely accepted, and studied the interaction between them less. This paper studies that problem from the perspective of investment efficiency. This paper examines the relation between long-term bank loans and investment efficiency, and finds that the level of over-investment and under-investment increases with the size of the loan. It shows that banks have not only played the role of corporate governance, but also seriously reduced investment efficiency. On this basis, we join the institutional investors variable, examine whether it has the fixed function of liabilities, but it shows that the existence of institutional investors enlarge the liabilities of the negative influence on enterprise investment efficiency. The results show that China’s bank and institutional investors have significant negative influence on enterprise, and they cooperate to enlarge the negative influence. The conclusion has implications to perfecting bank credit management system and improving investment behavior of institutional investors.