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基于信号博弈第申请卫生城市博弈分析

Based on Signaling Game Analysis for Sanitary City

中文摘要英文摘要

在申请创建卫生城市过程中,时常存在有城市弄虚作假行为。针对这一现象建立了城市与政府之间的信号博弈模型并对模型进行了详细的均衡分析,发现了市场完全成功的分离均衡是市场效率最高的均衡解的结论。实现市场完全成功的分离均衡的关键条件是保持较高的伪装成本、风险成本、风险概率和具有较高比例的高质量城市,于是针对性的提出了鼓励提高城市质量水平、加大申请城市审核力度、实现多途径监督机制的建议。

reate a health city in the application process, there is often a city falsifications. In response to this phenomenon are established between the Government of the city and the signal game model and the model of equilibrium analysis in detail and found that the complete success of the Fen Li balanced market is the market equilibrium solutions of the highest efficiency conclusion. To achieve a balanced market completely successful separation of the key conditions are disguised to maintain a high cost, risk cost, risk probability and a high proportion of high-quality city, so this proposed targeted incentives to upgrade the city level of quality, increase for city audit efforts to achieve multi-channel monitoring mechanism.

刘迪、孙文茂

环境管理环境科学理论

博弈论信号博弈创建卫生城市

Game TheorySignaling GameCreating Sanitary City

刘迪,孙文茂.基于信号博弈第申请卫生城市博弈分析[EB/OL].(2010-07-06)[2025-08-24].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/201007-118.点此复制

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