考虑零售商拥有自有品牌下制造商的推介策略研究
Strategy Selection of Manufacturer in the Presence of a Private Label Retailer
本文建立一个制造商与一个专卖专卖零售商和一个自有品牌商组成的供应链系统,通过博弈模型研究制造商的批发价与产品销量的均衡解,制造商推介策略的选择问题。分析结果表明:制造商推介水平与制造商消费者损失率会影响制造商产品的销量;进一步分析发现消费者损失率满足一定区间时,可使制造商产品销量实现最大化;对制造商而言,任意一种推介策略均优于不推介策略,且大多数情况下,制造商偏好非排他性推介。同时,通过对均衡解的分析,得到一些对制造商推介选择有意义的管理建议。
In this paper, regarding the choice of manufacturer\'s referral strategy, a supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer with a traditional retailer and a private brand retailer was studied, and the wholesale price and product sales of the manufacturer was discussed. The analysis results show that the manufacturer\'s referral level and the manufacturer\'s consumer loss rate will affect the quantity of manufacturer\'s product; further analysis finds that the consumer\'s loss rate meets a certain range, which can maximize the product quantity of manufacturer\'s. For manufacturers, referral is better than no referral, and in most cases, manufacturers prefer non-exclusive referrals. Meanwhile, through the analysis of the equilibrium solution, some management suggestions that are meaningful to the manufacturer\'s referral arStrategy Selection of Manufacturer in the Presence of a Private Label Retailere obtained.
吕红玉、李波
贸易经济经济计划、经济管理
供应链管理制造商推介自有品牌专卖零售商制造商分销渠道Stackelberg博弈
manufacturer referralprivate label retailermanufacturer distribution channelsupply chain managementStackelberg Game
吕红玉,李波.考虑零售商拥有自有品牌下制造商的推介策略研究[EB/OL].(2019-08-13)[2025-08-25].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/201908-12.点此复制
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