治理机制、代理成本与大股东解禁股出售

when transition to full-liquid stock market, how to alleviates large shareholders sale of un-freezing shares and protect investors' rights in very essential to ensure the health development of Chinese financial market. This paper suggests that the twin agency problems generated by the conflicting among insiders, governments and investors determine the sale behaviors of large shareholders which expropriate investors' benefits. Does the internal and external governance mechanism can reduce the agency cost and regulate selling of un-freezing shares in listed firms? Based on the natural experimental situation in which China is on the transition process from equity segmentation to full liquid stock market, this paper collects the data about sales of un-freezing shares and empirical studies show that: on the one hand, internal corporate governance mechanism is useful to control twin agency problems in government controlled firms, on the other hand, although the external corporate governance mechanism help to control the second agency cost in government controlled firms, it does not show the same effect on controlling the conflicts between insiders and outsiders. The conclusions help for the stable transition to full-liquid market and success of state-owned enterprises' share issue privatizations.