FO董事身份对上市公司非效率投资的影响研究——来自中国房地产上市公司的经验数据
he Effect of CFO Directorship to Inefficient Investment of Listed Companies: From Empirical Data of Chinese Real Estate Companies
本文基于董事会的视角,采用固定效应方法研究了 CFO董事身份对上市公司非效率投资的影响,并将非效率投资分解为过度投资与投资不足。研究发现,CFO进入董事会,能够有效抑制上市公司过度投资,缓解上市公司投资不足问题,但缓解上市公司投资不足的显著性强于抑制过度投资的显著性。这些结果表明,CFO 进入董事会能够提高其财务执行力,有效发挥治理作用,缓解上市公司非效率投资,进而提高公司资源的配置效率。
Based on the perspective of the board, This paper uses Fixed-effects regression to investigate the effect of CFO directorship to non-efficiency investment of listed companies, and divides inefficient investment into underinvestment and overinvestment. The study found, after CFO entered the board, they can effectively inhibit excessive investment in listed companies, and ease the problem of insufficient investment, but easing the underinvestment of listed companies is more significantly strong to overinvestment. These results indicate that, CFO on the board can improve their financial execution, play an effective role in governance, ease inefficient investment of listed companies, and thus improve the efficiency of company resources.
刘叶云、刘汉泽、邓丽娟
财政、金融
公司治理FO董事过度投资非效率投资
orporate GovernanceCFO DirectorOverinvestmentInefficient investment
刘叶云,刘汉泽,邓丽娟.FO董事身份对上市公司非效率投资的影响研究——来自中国房地产上市公司的经验数据[EB/OL].(2016-08-26)[2025-08-21].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/201608-171.点此复制
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