旁观者清?道德情景中不同角色视角的启动调节第三方道德判断

Previous studies have demonstrated inconsistencies in moral judgments of the same behavior among decision-makers, victims, and bystanders in a specific moral situation. Yet no study has examined how the experience of being decision-maker or victims can influence individuals moral judgments when they are third-party bystanders. The present study employed a modified harm paradigm combined with event-related potential (ERP) techniques to investigate the how the experiences of different moral roles modulates third-party moral judgments. Two experiments were included in the study. Each experiment consisted of two tasks: a moral role priming task and a main task of moral judgment. In the priming task, participants were assigned to one of three groups: decision-maker perspective group, victim perspective group, or the control group. Decision-makers groups needed to complete moral decision tasks while the victims group needed to undertake the decision of the decision-maker and to evaluate others decisions. The control group did not have a priming task. After the priming task, all the three groups need to undertake the main task, participants were instructed to judge the morality of decisions made by anonymous decision makers as a third party observer. Experiment 1 was a behavioral study involving 90 healthy adults (44 males, mean age 20.58 1.92 years). A 3 (Moral Role Perspective: Decision-maker, Victim, Control) 3 (Decision-makers Benefit: High, Medium, Low) 2 (Decision Outcome: Accept, Reject) mixed design was used. Experiment 2 is an Event-related potentials study, with 54 healthy adults (28 males, mean age 21.18 2.21 years) participated. A 2 (Moral Role Perspective: Decision-maker, Victim) 2 (Decision-makers Benefit: High, Low) 2 (Decision Outcome: Accept, Reject) mixed design was used. Behavioral results indicated that different moral role perspective priming did influence moral judgments, with individuals in the victim perspective group making stricter judgments compared to those in the decision-maker and control perspectives groups. Furthermore, the decision-makers benefit received from the immoral decisions can moderated this effect, with higher benefits leading to greater differences in moral judgments between groups. ERP results revealed that in the victim perspective group smaller N1 amplitudes and significantly larger FRN amplitudes were induced compared to the decision-maker perspective group when observing others decisions. Additionally, FRN amplitudes exhibited consistent patterns with the behavioral results: individuals in the victim perspective group showed significantly larger FRN amplitudes for accepted decisions compared to rejected ones, whereas this difference was not significant for those primed with the decision-maker perspective. No differences were found in the late component P3 across different perspectives. In conclusion, prior moral role experiences does influence individuals moral evaluations as third-party judges and this influence are moderated by the decision-makers benefit receiving from harming others. This effect occur primarily during the early emotional arousal stage rather than the later cognitive stage during the processing of moral decisions. These findings provide valuable insights into the flexibility in moral judgments and how past experiences shapes our moral standards.