|国家预印本平台
首页|不对称信息条件下中小企业联合融资研究

不对称信息条件下中小企业联合融资研究

Research on joint financing under asymmetric information of small and medium sized enterprises

中文摘要英文摘要

不对称信息下,对于以均存在资金约束的零售商和制造商组成的二级供应链,引入批发价格契约,以此建立联合融资模型。分析发现在此情况下供应链的最优订货量并没有达到平衡,因此在制造商确定最优批量的条件下引入回购契约予以改进。研究发现,回购价格与分布需求无关,制造商可以通过同时调整虚报因子与回购价格使供应链最优订货批量达到平衡;零售商破产概率随回购价格升高而降低,给出了供销双方愿意贷款和贷款机构愿意放贷的利率区间。最后通过算例说明了供应链内各参数的确定过程及其对各方利润的影响,证明联合融资可以提高整体效益。

Under asymmetric information, for the two-level supply chain of retailers and manufacturers, taking in the wholesale price contract, to set up joint financing model. Analysis found that in the circumstances the optimal order quantity of the supply chain is not balanced, so under the condition of the manufacturer to determine the optimal batch introduced ,the buyback contracts shall be improved. The results show that manufacturer can coordinate the supply chain through any factor and buy-back price. Ruin probability of the retailer will decrease with buy-back price increasing and proper interest rate range is decided in the model. Finally, a numerical example was used to display decision-making process of contract parameters in the supply chain co-financing and contract parameters’ influence on each party’s expected profit.

李墨奇、霍艳芳

财政、金融

不对称信息资金约束联合融资批发价格契约回购契约Stackelberg博弈

asymmetric informationbudget-constrainedco-financingwholesale price contractbuy-back contractStackelberg game

李墨奇,霍艳芳.不对称信息条件下中小企业联合融资研究[EB/OL].(2016-04-19)[2025-08-16].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/201604-230.点此复制

评论