基于销售努力和破产成本共担的供应链协调机制研究

his article considers a two-tier supply chain model with a single supplier and a single retailer, under the premise of imperfect financial markets and uncertain market demand. The upstream supplier is the core company in a Stackelberg game, while the downstream retailer is a follower with capital constraints. When there is a financing need, the retailer can apply for trade credit from the supplier. This article analyzes the financing and operational decisions of all parties in the supply chain under different scenarios involving trade credit as a financing mode, considering the presence of bankruptcy costs, sales effort.With the aim of optimizing individual profits, this study constructs mathematical models and conducts mathematical derivations to derive the ordering decisions of the downstream retailer, the sales effort decisions, and the wholesale pricing decisions of the upstream supplier. It compares the difference between the total profits of the retailer and supplier in a decentralized supply chain and the total profit maximization objective of a centralized supply chain under the influence of double marginalization effects. By introducing supply chain contracts and properly designing contract parameters, supply chain coordination can be achieved, thus leading to optimal overall supply chain performance. Finally, numerical simulation analysis is conducted to validate the theoretical model proposed in this paper.