|国家预印本平台
首页|官员更替与地方政府规模-基于动态面板模型的分析

官员更替与地方政府规模-基于动态面板模型的分析

Political Turnover and Local Government Size - An Analysis Based On Dynamic Model

中文摘要英文摘要

在现有财政分权的体制下,地方官员在政治晋升激励下进行地方政府规模的规划与政策的实施。本研究通过构建省级官员动态面板模型并运用系统GMM方法实证考察了1995年至2013年间官员更替对辖区内的地方政府规模的影响。研究发现:(1)官员更替当期致使地方政府规模显著降低;(2)官员任期内官员更替对地方政府规模的影响呈现倒U型,初期负影响,倒U型左端;中期呈现正影响,地方政府规模达到峰值并保持稳定,倒U型中端;末期仍为正影响,但正影响急剧减弱,倒U型右端。

Under the existing system of fiscal decentralization ,local governors which are motivated by the political promotion work on the planning of changing the local government size and implementing their policies.This paper studies the effects of political turnover on local government size by the method of systematic GMM based on dynamic panel data from 1995 to 2013.It reaches the following conclusions:firstly political turnover in the current period significantly reduces local government size ;secondly, the influence on local government size of political turnover during the tenure presents a feature of Inverted U Shape:negative effects appear at the initial term, which as the Inverted U Shape in left part depicts positive effects;positive effects appear at the medium term,during this period,the government size reaches its peak and then it remains stable,which as the Inverted U Shape in middle part depicts;positive effects weaken sharply at the final term,which as the Inverted U Shape in right part shows.

舒建玲、刘婷

中国政治世界政治财政、金融

官员更替地方政府规模政治晋升激励

political turnoverlocal government sizepolitical promotion-based incentive

舒建玲,刘婷.官员更替与地方政府规模-基于动态面板模型的分析[EB/OL].(2017-02-08)[2025-08-21].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/201702-35.点此复制

评论