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服务外包的制度创新:基于进入权的不完全契约

he Governance of E-commerce Institutional Innovation of Services Outsourcing: The Incomplete Contract Based on Access Theory

中文摘要英文摘要

服务外包是一种介于市场和企业之间的创新型组织形式,其关键治理机制是通过发包企业向接包企业开放其关键资源进入权,激励接包企业进行相应的人力资本专用性投资。本文基于进入权理论建立了一个不完全契约模型,通过对市场、外包和企业三种组织形式的比较制度分析得出,虽然三种组织形式都不可能达到社会最优的专用性人力资本投资激励水平,但基于进入权治理的服务外包组织可以得到次优的激励效果。服务外包有利于交易双方形成相对稳定高效的合作关系,拓展企业的经济边界,帮助企业在更大范围内整合知识和人力资源。

Service outsourcing is a kind of innovative form between market and firm. The main governance mechanism is that the outsourcee has to open its key resource to the outsourcer, in order to motivate the latter to carries on the corresponding specific human capital investment. Base on the access theory, a incomplete contract model is established and a comparative institutional analysis is performed toward the organization form of market, outsourcing and firm. We find that the organization form of service outsourcing, which exploits the governance power of access, could get the suboptimal incentive effectiveness, although all the three organizations forms couldn't get the social-best incentive effectiveness. By means of this governance mechanism, the partnership in services outsourcing become stable and effective, which can help the outsourcer to utilize human resources of knowledge resources in a wider scope.

刘征驰、唐梦齐

经济计划、经济管理贸易经济

服务外包进入权人力资本不完全契约

Services OutsourcingRight of AccessHuman CapitalIncomplete contract

刘征驰,唐梦齐.服务外包的制度创新:基于进入权的不完全契约[EB/OL].(2013-09-25)[2025-08-11].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/201309-356.点此复制

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