EO任期、企业生命周期与盈余管理

he CEO tenure system of listed companies is an important part of the current capital market system construction. Most of the existing researches on CEO tenure are from the perspective of enterprise static, ignoring the impact of the life cycle stage on CEO earnings management motivation. Based on this, this paper takes 2010-2018 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the research object to explore the relationship between CEO tenure and earnings management. The empirical results show that the longer the tenure of CEO, the weaker the motivation of earnings management, and the lower the degree of corporate manipulative accruals, and this relationship is more significant in young CEO. Secondly, this paper does not find that the CEO has obvious manipulative accruals in the year of succession and the year before leaving office. In the further study of the corporate life cycle, we also find that the longer the CEO\'s tenure is, the lower the degree of earnings management is, and the more obvious the effect is on the growing enterprises, but the relationship is not found in the declining enterprises. From the perspective of enterprise life cycle, this study broadens the research ideas of CEO tenure and earnings management, and also provides some empirical evidence for the formulation of CEO\'s personnel appointment policy.