企业环保激励机制分析——基于委托—代理理论
nalysis on Stimulation of Protection to the Environment based on the Principal-Agent Model
为了解决政府激励企业进行环保过程中所存在的信息不对称性问题，本文以信息经济学中的委托—代理理论为依托，建立理想模型，提出有效激励机制，并结合我国现实，分析该机制在实际操作过程中与理想模型之间存在的差距及应做的调整。
We have made an ideal model based on the principle –agent theory and built an efficient stimulating mechanism in order to solve the problems of asymmetric information while government stimulates enter`prises to protect the environment. In addition, we have analyzed the lap between the ideal and factual condition in China and recommended some measures for adjustment.
雷霆、刘雪、刘旭
环境管理经济学环境科学理论
委托—代理政府企业激励环保
Principle-AgentGovernmentEnterpriseStimulation to the Protection of Environment
雷霆,刘雪,刘旭.企业环保激励机制分析——基于委托—代理理论[EB/OL].(2008-06-02)[2025-08-21].http://www.paper.edu.cn/releasepaper/content/200806-3.点此复制
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