信息非对称下动态投融资的约束信号博弈模型

n this paper, we study firm’s dynamic investment and financing problem and establish corresponding constrained signaling game models. Two cases are analyzed in details. One is the case in which the firm’s manager and the investor are both myopic in cooperation aspect, and the other is the case in which the firm’s manager and the investor are going to cooperate with each other for a longer time. The analysis shows that in the dynamic investment and financing process, the ratio of manager’s investment amount to the total investment amount and the investment profit ratio have the function of transferring the manager’s and the project’s signals of what and how they should be. The investor can infer the degree of the manager’s adverse selection and moral hazard by analyzing these signals. If the manager places the proportion of his investment amount to the total investment amount and his moral hazard degree within an appropriate scope, he can obtain his maximum operation utility within a