随机到达的不完全信息对专利竞赛的影响

here is incomplete information about the future prospect of the patent contained in the events happened randomly outside, and the informational and technical uncertainty in whether the R&D can succeed will influence enterprises’ patent R&D investment decisions. By considering incomplete information, technical uncertainty and competition, and This paper develops an investment decision-making model based on real options analysis, and obtains the critical believes needed for patent R&D investments of single enterprise and duopoly enterprises respectively, and further analyzes the equilibrium types and related conditions that may appear in the patent race between two symmetric enterprises. The result shows that the inherent characteristic of patents, the “winner takes all”, and the technical uncertainty may lead the enterprises to delay its investment or bring its investment forward; the faster the signal received, the higher the quality of the signal will be and the follower’s investment belief required will be higher. Moreover, the competition equilibrium among the enterprises can result in preemption equilibrium. and simultaneous investment equilibrium..