服务外包供应链质量协调策略研究

Our research problem of the outsourcing supply chain quality game is that the service provider needs to pay how much per unit penalty quantity to the outsourcer when the service provider has the quality problem because of his own reasons. First, we study the any party of the service outsourcing and consider the coordination scope of the per unit penalty quantity and the optimal per unit penalty quantity problem with only considering their own interests. Secondly, we construct the optimal coordination scope based on the overall interests of the supply chain and solve the equilibrium penalty quantity under the supply chain coordination. The result is shown that if the any party of the service outsourcing only to consider its own best interests and regardless of the interests of the opposite party, they have no stable equilibrium solution. If the parties simultaneously take into account their own best interests without taking into account each other's interests, then the parties may fall into prisoner's dilemma. Even if the two sides have a equilibrium solution, the equilibrium solution is also the same to the equilibrium solution of the supply chain. Therefore, the two sides have a stable equilibrium solution based on the two sides will take into account the overall interests of the supply chain. This paper can be obtained not only the scope of coordination, and solved the stable equilibrium solution size. These conclusions are consistent with the facts and have some theoretical guidance value in practice.