不完美疫苗下的自愿接种行为演化动力学

Voluntary vaccination is crucial for public health. The likelihood that the vaccinated gets fully immune is typically referred as the vaccine efficacy. In addition to this, the efficacy of vaccines also depends on inhibiting the transmission rates and protecting patients from critical symptoms. It has yet to be answered how the multi-efficacy of vaccines affects the vaccination behavior. Here, we propose a game theoretical model of vaccination behavior with a heterogeneous-transmission epidemiological process. Intuitively, individuals are likely to take vaccination for either high-efficient vaccines or for epidemics with large basic reproductive number. We find, however, the low economic discount rate can promote the uptake level for low-effectiveness vaccines and epidemics with small basic reproductive numbers. This result suggests that the perceived cost is more important than the risk of infection and the effectiveness of vaccines. Our model can be insightful for epidemic control.