考虑制造商公平关切的强势零售商自有品牌导入策略研究

his paper established a Stackelberg game to research the store brand introducing strategy for a powerful retailer in a supply chain which is consisted of a manufacturer and a retailer. As the leader of the supply chain, the retailer chooses whether to introduce the store brand, while the manufacturer may have fairness concern towards the channel leader. Firstly, the paper resolved the optimal strategy as well as the profit for both manufacturer and retailer. Secondly, the paper investigated the impact of store brand introducing and fairness concern of the manufacturer by comparing four models. The results show that the manufacturer would raise the wholesale price and also the profit level when considering the fairness concern. The retailer would result in profit increasing with the introducing of store brand. For manufacturers, the store brand does not always harm their interests. The store brand would also beneficial to the manufacturer on condition that the substitution rate of the store brand is quite large.